Abstract:
This thesis critically examines the preferential treatment granted to foreign investors
under the Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) mechanism. It explores how
ISDS, a framework established within International Investment Agreements (IIAs),
offers foreign investors the right to bypass domestic courts and directly arbitrate
disputes against host states, a privilege not extended to domestic investors or foreign
nationals of non-contracting states. This unequal access raises concerns about fairness,
equity, and justice in the international investment regime, as it creates an imbalanced
landscape where foreign investors are afforded greater procedural rights than their
domestic counterparts. By analyzing the evolution of ISDS, the thesis delves into its
justification, particularly through the lens of the International Minimum Standard
(IMS), which asserts that foreign investors should be treated fairly and without
discrimination. The study highlights the implications of this preferential treatment,
arguing that it not only undermines domestic judicial systems but also exacerbates
competitive disadvantages faced by local investors. It further critiques ISDS
mechanisms for fostering inequalities, reinforcing foreign privilege, and limiting the
regulatory autonomy of states. Ultimately, the thesis calls for reforms to promote a
more equitable balance between foreign and domestic investors, ensuring justice and
fairness in international investment law.
